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Populist Conundrum:  Big Banks or Plaintiffs’ Bar? 
Banks Win as Congress Overrides the CFPB Rule 
Banning Class Action Waivers in Arbitration 
Agreements 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Americans have distrusted ambulance-chasing plaintiffs’ 
attorneys and money-hungry financial service providers for years.1  The 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB” or “the Bureau”) Final 
Rule on Arbitration Agreements (“Final Rule”) pitted these two groups 
against each other.2  The CFPB exercised its authority to limit or prohibit 
the use of pre-dispute arbitration agreements granted by Section 1028(b) 
of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank”) by publishing the Final Rule to the Federal Register on 
July 19, 2017.3  The Final Rule prohibited the use of arbitration 
agreements that bar consumers from participating in class actions, but did 
not prohibit the use of arbitration altogether.4  The rule became effective 
on September 18, 2017, and would have applied to contracts entered into 
 
 1. See Nicholas M. Gess et al., Christmas in July for Plaintiffs Bar—CFPB Arbitration 
Rule to Take Effect, NAT’L L. REV. (July 14, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/
christmas-july-plaintiffs-bar-cfpb-arbitration-rule-to-take-effect (“All of these eventualities 
must be viewed against a political backdrop in which the significant concerns of the business 
community about the Rule will run up against a federal agency that has substantial support 
from consumers who are constituents and voters, and who harbor a strong distrust of the 
financial services sector.”); Kenny Stein, Stop President Obama’s Trial Lawyer Giveaway, 
FREEDOMWORKS (June 27, 2016), http://www.freedomworks.org/content/stop-president-
obamas-trial-lawyer-giveaway (urging readers of a conservative blog to submit public 
comments on the CFPB’s Proposed Rule). 
 2. See Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 1040.4 (repealed 2017) (limiting arbitration 
agreements to exclude class action waivers and establishing a monitoring provision to allow 
the CFPB to continue observing the use of arbitration in consumer financial services). 
 3. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210, 33320 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. § 1040); 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2016) (“The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or 
impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a 
consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future 
dispute between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of 
conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”). 
 4. 12 C.F.R. 1040.4 (repealed 2017).  
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after March 19, 2018.5  However, the Final Rule was short-lived.6  
Congress used the Congressional Review Act (“CRA”)7 to overturn the 
rule when the Senate passed a resolution of disapproval by a narrow 51-
50 vote on October 24, 2017, with Vice President Mike Pence voting as 
the tie breaker.8  The Final Rule would have provided a valuable tool to 
improve private enforcement through litigation by allowing consumers to 
bring class actions against financial service providers.9  Additionally, the 
monitoring provision would have increased transparency in the 
arbitration process to further aid in the Bureau’s mission for consumer 
protection and keep the opportunity to expedite claims through arbitration 
open for consumers who still wish to use it.10  However, concerns about 
the costs to the financial services industry and poor popular opinions of 
class action lawyers ultimately led to the demise of the Final Rule.11 
This Note examines the Final Rule and concludes that, despite 
some flaws, it would have helped consumers and evened the playing field 
between consumers and financial service providers.  Part II provides a 
brief overview of the decades-long debate over the practice of 
arbitration.12  Part III analyzes the Final Rule in conjunction with the 
Arbitration Study (“the Study”) and argues for why it was ultimately 
good for consumers.13  Part IV examines the political climate in which 
the Final Rule went into effect and the imperfections that led to its 
repeal.14  Part V briefly summarizes and concludes the Note.15  
 
 5. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210. 
 6. Ian McKendry, Senate Votes to Repeal CFPB Arbitration Rule in Win for Financial 
Institutions, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 2017, at 1. 
 7. Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2016) (allowing both houses of Congress 
to pass a joint resolution of disapproval of agency rulemaking to repeal a final rule). 
 8. Ian McKendry, supra note 6, at 2. 
 9. 12 C.F.R. § 1040.4(a). 
 10. Id. § 1040.4(b). 
 11. McKendry, supra note 6, at 3 (quoting Sen. John Cornyn saying, “There is no reason 
for us to enrich a class of lawyers who . . . bring these lawsuits and see consumers getting 
pennies on the dollar, which is what the status quo would permit . . . .”). 
 12. See infra Part II. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Part IV. 
 15. See infra Part V. 
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE ARBITRATION DEBATE 
A. Protections of Arbitration Agreements in the United States  
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”) made arbitration 
agreements in contract-related disputes valid and enforceable “save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”16  Over the years, arbitration has become a contentious 
practice, particularly when pre-dispute arbitration clauses are written into 
contracts between parties with unequal bargaining power.17  Issues arise 
when consumers are locked into shrinkwrap agreements without knowing 
they are agreeing to resolve any disputes against the company through 
arbitration—in which the normal rules of evidence, discovery, and 
appeals are surrendered in favor of a quick and private proceeding.18   
One of the most controversial aspects of standard arbitration 
agreements is that many involve class action waivers, preventing 
consumers from joining together to litigate claims that involve small 
amounts of harm to a large number of people.19  This is troublesome when 
individual consumers are unlikely to bring a claim at all if the value is not 
large enough to make the costs associated with proceeding individually 
worth it and are also unable to join a class action.20  
 
 16. Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2016). 
 17. See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (holding in a 
controversial decision that the FAA preempted California’s rule on the unconscionability of 
class action waivers in consumer contracts); DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 
(2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“It has become routine, in a large part due to this Court’s 
decisions, for powerful economic enterprises to write into their form contracts with consumers 
and employees no-class-action arbitration clauses.”); Letter from Judith Resnik, Professor of 
Law, Yale Law School, to the Hon. Richard Cordray, Dir., CFPB (Aug. 12, 2016) (“But the 
clauses in consumer services and on job application forms do not merit the term ‘contract.’ 
They are neither bargained for nor bargainable.”). 
 18. See Richard Frankel, “What We Lose in Sales, We Make Up in Volume”:  The Faulty 
Logic of The Financial Service Industry’s Response to the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s Proposed Rule Prohibiting Class Action Bans in Arbitration Clauses, 48 ST. 
MARY’S L. J. 283, 284–87 (2016) (examining the Final Rule when it was proposed by the 
CFPB and arguing that financial service providers are the only parties that benefit from class 
action waivers). 
 19. See id. at 284 (“[I]n the area of consumer financial services—such as banking, credit 
cards, and lending agreements—virtually every company that imposes a mandatory 
arbitration clause on its customers also includes a provision barring the customer from 
participating in a class action or any other joint proceeding.”). 
 20. Id. at 285. 
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Those in support of class action waivers argue that the class 
action system is costly and ineffective, and provides little benefit to 
consumers at an individual level.21  For individuals, arbitration tends to 
be more efficient and provide larger awards than consumers would be 
able to get from class actions.22  Many supporters of class action waivers 
argue that the bulk of class settlements are the attorneys’ fees rather than 
relief for the consumers.23  Additionally, critics of the Final Rule argue 
that the legal system is overburdened already, and that an increase in class 
action litigation will only benefit trial attorneys by generating multi-
million dollar legal fees.24 
In Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., the California 
Supreme Court pushed back against the practice of including class action 
waivers, and held that class action waivers in consumer contracts were 
unconscionable.25  Several years later, in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,26 
the U.S. Supreme Court held in a controversial 5-4 decision that 
California’s Discover Bank rule was preempted by the FAA.27  
Concepcion limits a state’s ability to pass legislation that interferes with 
the FAA, but Congress can still act, and has previously acted to limit 
arbitration agreements in mortgage loans, consumer and securities 
broker-dealers, investment advisers, and certain whistleblower 
proceedings.28  
 
 21. See Patrick McHenry et al., Comment Letter on CFPB Proposed Rule on Arbitration 
Agreements (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentId=C 
FPB-2016-0020-5917&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf (“[W]hatever the Bureau’s 
intention, rather than giving consumers greater access to justice, the proposal will make it 
more difficult and more expensive for consumers to resolve disputes with service providers.”). 
 22. See Frankel, supra note 18, at 285 (“Defenders of class action bans . . .  respond that 
the class action system is broken and imposes huge costs on companies while providing little 
or no benefit to consumers.”).  
 23. See Gess et al., supra note 1 (questioning the reliability of the Arbitration Study for 
failing to exclude contingent attorney fees for class actions from its calculations when 
evaluating how consumers fare in class actions versus arbitration). 
 24. See McHenry et al., supra note 21 (arguing that, even if well-intentioned, the Final 
Rule would make settling claims with financial service providers more expensive for 
consumers). 
 25. Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 36 Cal.4th 148, 162–63 (2005). 
 26. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 at 33211 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1040). 
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B. The Arbitration Study and the Final Rule 
Section 1028(b) of Dodd-Frank gave the CFPB authority to limit 
or prohibit the use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses.29  Section 1028 
originates from a whitepaper released by the Department of Treasury in 
June 2009, saying that consumers often do not know that they waive their 
rights to trial when they sign contracts to take out a loan and suggesting 
that the CFPB30 study the use of arbitration clauses.31  In order for the 
CFPB to exercise its authority to limit or prohibit the use of pre-dispute 
arbitration clauses, Dodd-Frank dictated the rule has to be “in the public 
interest and for the protection of consumers” and consistent with the 
arbitration study authorized by section 1028(a).32  
The CFPB conducted the Study to determine whether to regulate 
arbitration.33  The Study focused on measuring the prevalence of 
arbitration agreements in consumer financial products and services 
contracts and the effects of individual arbitration versus consumer class 
actions.34  The Study focused on six specific consumer financial product 
markets:  credit cards, checking accounts, prepaid reloadable cards, 
private student loans, payday loans, and mobile wireless third-party 
billing.35  Among its findings, the Study found that tens of millions of 
consumers are subject to arbitration agreements through their contracts in 
these product markets, and nearly all of these arbitration agreements 
included class action waivers.36  The Study also surveyed over 1,000 
consumers and found that more than half of those subject to arbitration 
 
 29. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 
1028(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2016) (“The Bureau, by regulation, may prohibit or impose 
conditions or limitations on the use of an agreement between a covered person and a consumer 
for a consumer financial product or service providing for arbitration of any future dispute 
between the parties, if the Bureau finds that such a prohibition or imposition of conditions or 
limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”). 
 30. The whitepaper was written when the CFPB was still known as the Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency.  David L. Noll, Regulating Arbitration, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 985, 
1038 (Aug., 2017). 
 31. See id. (arguing that the CFPB’s rule on arbitration falls short of ensuring 
enforcement and compliance with consumer financial protection laws). 
 32. Dodd-Frank §§ 1028(a)–(b), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5518(a)–(b). 
 33. CFPB, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK 
WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 1028(a) (2015) [hereinafter 
ARBITRATION STUDY]. 
 34. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 3321, 33220 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1040).  
 35. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 1, at 7. 
 36. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33222. 
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agreements in their credit card contracts thought they could participate in 
a class action lawsuit against the card issuer.37   
To illustrate the benefit of consumer financial class actions, the 
CFPB analyzed 419 of 422 consumer financial class settlements between 
the years 2008 and 2012.38  These settlements involved 350 million class 
members total and resulted in a gross recovery amount of $2.7 billion.39  
In addition to the staggering award values, fifty-three of the 419 
settlements involving 106 million class members included behavioral 
relief to change companies’ harmful practices as part of the settlement.40 
Overall, the CFPB determined that the findings of the Study 
necessitated a limit on pre-dispute arbitration clauses, including the 
potential to regulate the practice further in the future.41  In May of 2016, 
the CFPB proposed a rule to address concerns about class action waivers 
written into pre-dispute arbitration clauses in consumer financial services 
contracts.42  After reviewing the comments received during the public 
comment period, the CFPB published the Final Rule on arbitration 
agreements to the Federal Register.43   
The Final Rule had two parts:  (1) it prohibited covered financial 
service providers44 from using class action waivers in covered consumer 
financial product or service contracts,45 and (2) it required covered 
 
 37. Id. at 33224. 
 38. Id. at 33233.  Three of the class settlements were excluded because the CFPB could 
not find data on the attorney’s fees.  Id. at 33233 n. 328.  
 39. Id. at 33234. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 33210. 
 42. Id. at 33246. 
 43. Id. at 33247. 
 44. Service providers include any person that (1) participates in designing, operating, or 
maintaining the consumer financial product or service, or (2) processes transactions relating 
to the consumer financial product or service.  12 U.S.C. § 5481(26) (2016).  Excluded from 
this definition are (1) persons regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, (2) 
broker dealers, (3) investment advisers, (4) persons regulated by the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, (5) federal agencies, (6) providers of less than twenty-five consumers 
in a calendar year, (7) merchants, retailers, or sellers of nonfinancial goods or services, (8) 
employers providing a product or service to an employee.  Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1020.3(b) (repealed 2017). 
 45. Covered products include products and services (1) offering an extension of 
consumer credit, (2) extending automobile leases, (3) providing debt management services, 
(4) providing consumer credit reports, (5) providing accounts subject to the Truth in Savings 
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 4301 (2016), (6) providing accounts subject to the Electronic Fund Transfer 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693 (2016), (7) transmitting or exchanging funds as defined by 12 U.S.C. 
§ 5481 (2016), (8) accepting financial or banking data directly from a consumer for the 
purpose of initiating payment by a consumer, (9) providing check cashing, check collection, 
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providers to submit certain arbitral records and court records to the 
CFPB.46  The first part would require covered providers to put language 
in the agreements to reflect the limitation on class action waivers.47  The 
CFPB planned on using the records required by the second part of the 
rule to monitor arbitral and court proceedings to determine if there are 
new developments that raise consumer protection concerns.48  The CFPB 
reserved the ability in the Final Rule to later require these records to be 
posted on the CFPB’s website with appropriate redactions to “provide 
greater transparency into the arbitration of consumer disputes.”49  The 
Final Rule would have applied to consumer financial product and service 
providers in the market of extending consumer credit, brokering 
automobile leases, providing debt management services, providing 
consumer credit reports, transmitting funds, processing payments, and 
collecting debt.50  
III. ANALYSIS OF THE FINAL RULE 
A. Utility of Arbitration 
Critics of the rule believe that class actions benefit plaintiffs’ 
attorneys more than individual consumers, and that a ban on class actions 
would deprive consumers of the efficiency of arbitration.51   The Study 
 
or check guaranty services, and (10) collecting debt arising from any of the aforementioned 
consumer financial services. Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 1040.3(a)(1)–(10). 
 46. Records to be submitted are (1) the initial claim and any counterclaim, (2) the answer 
to any initial claim and/or counterclaim, (3) the pre-dispute arbitration agreement filed with 
the arbitrator or arbitration administrator, (4) the judgment or award, if any, (5) any 
communication from the arbitration or arbitration administrator if an arbitrator refuses to 
administer arbitration or dismisses a claim, and (6) any submission to a court seeking 
dismissal, deferral, or stay of any aspect of a case. Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 
1040.4(b). 
 47. Arbitration Agreements, 12 C.F.R. § 1040.4(a)(2)(i) (“[A] provider shall ensure that 
any such pre-dispute arbitration agreement contains the following provision:  ‘We agree that 
neither we nor anyone else will rely on this agreement to stop you from being part of a class 
action case in court.  You may file a class action in court or you may be a member of a class 
action filed by someone else.’”). 
 48. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Brenna A. Sheffield, Note and Comment, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration 
Clauses in Consumer Financial Products: The CFPB’s Proposed Regulation and Its 
Consistency with the Arbitration Study, 20 N.C. BANKING INST. 221 (2016) (examining the 
proposed rule on arbitration prior to the final rule on whether it was consistent with the 
standards in Dodd-Frank). 
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did not exclude contingent attorneys’ fees from its reports on class action 
awards, which critics say inflates the award total when not all of that 
amount is going to consumers.52  The “father of arbitration clauses,” Alan 
S. Kaplinsky53 warned that if the rule went into effect, an avalanche of 
litigation would follow, further burdening the legal system and depriving 
consumers of the benefits of quicker arbitration proceedings.54  
Representative Patrick McHenry and Senator Ben Sasse wrote a letter 
endorsed by dozens of other Republican members of Congress, 
concerned with the costs of defending class actions being passed on to 
consumers and expressed doubt about the way the Study analyzed 
consumer outcomes.55  The letter claimed that the Final Rule would make 
it more difficult and expensive for consumers to resolve disputes with 
their providers than if they went through individual arbitration, and urged 
the CFPB to “adopt a less divisive, more reasonable approach” that 
“respects the decisions of consumers.”56  Of the over 6,000 public 
comments received on the Proposed Rule, hundreds of nearly identical 
comments came from private citizens that poured in during the comment 
period calling the Proposed Rule “Obama’s trial lawyer payday.”57   
While arbitration may be more efficient and provide greater 
individual award amounts than litigation, few consumers actually use 
arbitration to get relief.58  Consumers enter into arbitration agreements 
every day when they acquire checking accounts, private student loans, 
 
 52. Gess et al., supra note 1. 
 53. Alan Kaplinsky is a partner at Ballard Spahr that is said to have “pioneered” the use 
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements and helped launch the blog CFPBMonitor.com. Alan S. 
Kaplinsky, BALLARD SPAHR LLP, http://www.ballardspahr.com/people/attorneys/
kaplinsky_alan.aspx (last visited Sept. 16, 2017). 
 54. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, U.S. Agency Moves to Allow Class-
Action Lawsuits Against Financial Firms, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (July 10, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/07/10/business/dealbook/class-action-lawsuits-finance-banks.html. 
 55. McHenry et al., supra note 21. 
 56. McHenry et al., supra note 21. 
 57. See, e.g., Jon Bradfield, Comment Letter on CFPB Proposed Rule on Arbitration 
Agreements (Aug. 22, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0020-
3318 (“Trial lawyers don’t need any more money than their billable hours.”); Lucia Walrath, 
Comment Letter on CFPB Proposed Rule on Arbitration Agreements (Aug. 18, 2016), https:/
/www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0020-2537 (“Obama’s trial lawyer payday 
must be stopped.”).   
 58. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210 (“This final rule is based on the 
Bureau’s findings . . . that pre-dispute arbitration agreements are being widely used to prevent 
consumers from seeking relief from legal violations on a class basis, and that consumers rarely 
file individual lawsuits or arbitration cases to obtain such relief.”). 
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prepaid cards, and many other financial products and services.59  Most 
consumers have little understanding of the arbitration agreements in the 
contracts they sign or how often they waive their rights to a trial when 
entering into these agreements.60  The American Arbitration Association 
(“AAA”) is the largest non-profit arbitration administrator in the United 
States and averages under 1,500 consumer arbitration proceedings 
annually.61  For those who do end up seeking legal redress for a claim 
against their financial service providers, many claims are too small to 
make individual action worth the time, money, and effort.62  For example, 
the $30.22 claim in Concepcion would not be worth the legal fees 
associated with either arbitration or litigation, if they could even get an 
attorney to take their claim to begin with.63  Because of this, many 
consumers are left without any redress at all when their arbitration 
agreements involve class action waivers.64  
Not only is arbitration rarely used by consumers,65 but class 
arbitration is virtually nonexistent.66  The Study identified 1,847 
arbitration filings in total for the product markets studied—averaging 
about 616 per year for 2010, 2011, and 2012.67  The CFPB also found 
that only two class arbitrations were filed between 2010 and 2012.68  
These numbers are shockingly low, considering millions of consumers 
are covered by these arbitration agreements and thirty-two million 
consumers benefit from class actions altogether each year.69 
 
 59. See id. at 33211 (“In the last few decades, companies have begun inserting arbitration 
agreements in a wide variety of standard-form contracts….”). 
 60. See id. at 33224 (“[T]he survey found that consumers generally lacked awareness 
regarding the effects of arbitration agreements.”). 
 61. Resnik, supra note 17, at 3 (“[T]housands of courts operate in the state and federal 
systems, where civil filings are estimates to run between 25 and 47 million cases annually, 
excluding about 50–60 million juvenile and traffic cases.”). 
 62. See Resnik, supra note 17, at 4 (“My goal is to turn attention to the underlying fact 
that almost no consumers or employees ‘do’ arbitration at all.”).  
 63. See AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for 
the possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”).  
 64. See Resnik, supra note 17, at 4 (“My goal is to turn attention to the underlying fact 
that almost no consumers or employees ‘do’ arbitration at all.”). 
 65. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33227. 
 66. Id. at 33227. 
 67. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 20. 
 68. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33227. 
 69. Resnik, supra note 17. 
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B. Class Actions as an Enforcement Tool 
To supporters of the rule, class action waivers are seen as 
hindering enforcement through private litigation, essentially giving 
companies a “get out of jail free” card.70  Richard Cordray, director of the 
CFPB at the time of the Study, said that by blocking group lawsuits, 
mandatory arbitration clauses block consumers’ ability to seek legal 
redress “when a little harm happens to a lot of people.”71  A comment 
letter submitted by Senator Harry Reid and signed by thirty-seven fellow 
Senators commended Cordray on the proposed rule and stressed the 
importance of class actions for consumer protection.72  Senator Reid’s 
letter asserted that class action waivers protect corporations from 
accountability for “abusive, anti-consumer practices,” which allows for 
these practices to continue unchecked.73   
Beyond monetary relief for individual consumers, the Final Rule 
would have provided a huge benefit to consumers by encouraging private 
enforcement through litigation.74  Because of the scarceness of arbitration 
proceedings, it is difficult to ensure that consumer financial service 
providers are maintaining ethical business practices.75  Arbitration 
proceedings lack the independence of elected or appointed judges and 
published opinions available for public inspection.76  
The CFPB studied the utility of class actions as an enforcement 
tool by analyzing the extent to which private class actions overlapped 
with government enforcement actions, and which types of actions 
occurred first when the two overlapped.77  The CFPB found that for 88% 
 
 70. See Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck 
of Justice, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/201 
5/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html 
(beginning a three-part series on arbitration in consumer and employment contracts); Noll, 
supra note 30, at 986 (arguing that the CFPB’s rule on arbitration falls short of ensuring 
enforcement and compliance with consumer financial protection laws). 
 71. Richard Cordray, Let Consumers Sue Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2017), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2017/08/22/opinion/let-consumers-sue-companies.html?mcubz=3.  
 72. Harry Reid et al., Comment Letter on CFPB Proposed Rule on Arbitration 
Agreements (Aug. 3, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=CFPB-2016-0020-
1482.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 at 33210 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1040). 
 75. Resnik, supra note 17, at 3. 
 76. Resnik, supra note 17, at 3. 
 77. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33237. 
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of public enforcement actions, there was not an overlapping private 
action.78  For 68% of the private class actions, there was not an 
overlapping public enforcement action.79  When the two did overlap, 
private class actions tended to come before government enforcement 
actions.80  The CFPB interpreted this data to mean that private class 
actions complement government enforcement, especially given 
increasing limitations on resources available to regulators.81  
The enforcement value of class actions was also demonstrated by 
the fifty-three settlements that mandated a change in harmful practices 
the Study analyzed.82  These settlements affected at least 106 million 
individual class members.83  While some of those class members may no 
longer have contractual relationships with the defendant companies, that 
number also does not account for future consumers who will 
unknowingly benefit from the changes.84 
C. Monitoring Requirement and Arbitration Transparency  
The monitoring rule would have provided transparency for the 
arbitration process and helped the CFPB assess whether there is a need to 
regulate arbitration agreements further by requiring covered providers to 
submit arbitral and court records to the CFPB.85  The CFPB was 
particularly concerned with monitoring for arbitrations administered by 
biased administrators.86  Some consumer advocates submitted comments 
claiming that arbitration can never be neutral because of biases towards 
“repeat players.”87  While the CFPB did attempt to analyze this long-
alleged bias, it maintained that the results of the Study did not identify an 
obvious bias favoring repeat players.88  The small pool of data was a clear 
limitation on the ability of the Study to fully analyze this issue.89  By 
 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 33234. 
 83. Id.; ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 8, at 22. 
 84. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 8, at 23, n. 42. 
 85. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33310. 
 86. Id. at 33253. 
 87. Id. at 33228. 
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continuing to monitor the results of arbitration relating to consumer 
financial products and services, the CFPB could have acted further if it 
determined there were new “developments that raise consumer protection 
concerns.”90 
While the CFPB maintains that the results of the Study were not 
conclusive in determining a “repeat player” bias, the data it collected did 
seem to lean in that direction.91  The Study looked at 158 disputes with 
affirmative consumer claims across all product markets brought in the 
years 2010 and 2011 and their outcomes broken into which disputes 
involved “repeat players” on either side.92  For the disputes involving a 
repeat company and no consumer lawyer, only four out of thirty-eight 
disputes ended with any form of award for the consumer.93  When there 
was a repeat company and a non-repeat consumer lawyer, nine out of 
twenty-one consumers saw an award.94  When both parties involved a 
repeat player, only thirteen out of eighty-five consumers had any type of 
award.95  The sample size for non-repeat companies was small, with six 
out of fourteen disputes ending with a consumer award.96  Overall, only 
thirty-two disputes out of the 158 disputes studied ended with a grant of 
relief for consumers.97  The Study was clearly limited by such a small 
sample size overall, but the results do tend to show that repeat companies 
seem to fare better in these disputes than consumers, especially 
consumers with a non-repeat attorney or no attorney at all.98  If a larger 
sample size reveals the opposite or a statistically insignificant effect, the 
CFPB could have chosen not to regulate arbitration further by banning 
arbitration agreements altogether.99 
The AAA provided these disputes, filed by consumers or 
companies from the beginning of 2010 through the end of 2012, to the 
 
 90. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210. 
 91. ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33, § 5, at 56–68. 
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 99. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210, 33252 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 
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CFPB pursuant to a non-disclosure agreement.100  The authority to 
continue monitoring specified arbitral and court records would have 
helped the CFPB keep track of particular risks to consumers by noting 
trends in the types of violations being enforced through private 
enforcement actions without having to rely on private arbitration 
administrators to turn over information limited by short time frames and 
non-disclosure agreements.101  The monitoring rule would have also 
helped the CFPB take enforcement action against providers that are 
repeatedly harming consumers.102  Class actions and the court system as 
a whole are not perfect, but with litigation comes extensive 
documentation and recordkeeping subject to public scrutiny.103  Holding 
arbitration administrators accountable in the same way that we expect 
from courts is the first step in improving the system in a way that can 
actually benefit both consumers and companies.104  
One of the most prevalent criticisms of the Final Rule was that 
the Study was “deeply flawed.”105  Despite its flaws, the Study took on 
an extremely challenging proposition by attempting to study trends in 
arbitration.106  Since arbitration often keeps plaintiffs from filing claims, 
claims that actually do get brought to arbitration may tend to be only 
significantly stronger cases and claims for higher dollar amounts, and 
therefore not representative of all of the harms to consumers that go 
unchecked.107  It is also difficult to quantify success, as many arbitral 
awards may include equitable relief or nominal damages.108  Despite 
these difficulties, which critics of the Final Rule may label as “flaws,” the 
CFPB concluded in the Study that plaintiffs in consumer financial 
arbitrations prevailed only 20% of the time.109  The monitoring provision 
would allow the CFPB to continue studying the fairness of arbitration for 
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consumers, and could have helped make up for what the Study lacked in 
resources and practicality.110 
IV. FAILURE OF THE FINAL RULE 
A. The Political Climate and Events Surrounding Reversal of the 
Final Rule  
Challenges to the Final Rule appeared almost immediately after 
it was published in the Federal Register.111  The House of Representatives 
passed a resolution of disapproval under the CRA on July 25, 2017, just 
six days after the Final Rule was published.112  The House vote was 
mostly along party lines, gathering the necessary votes in a relatively 
short period of time.113  The Senate, however, experienced more difficulty 
in gathering support for the resolution, leaving uncertain the fate of the 
Final Rule for several months while the issue was publicly debated.114 
1. Wells Fargo Unauthorized Accounts Scandal 
The issue of the Wells Fargo unauthorized accounts scandal 
resurfaced following the House vote, reminding the public of a prime 
example of “when a little harm happens to a lot of people.”115  In 
September 2016, news broke that Wells Fargo employees created 
 
 110. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (July 19, 2017) (to be codified at 12 
C.F.R. pt. 1040) (“The Bureau will use the information it collects to continue monitoring 
arbitral and court proceedings to determine whether there are developments that raise 
consumer protection concerns that may warrant further Bureau action.”). 
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cubz=3; Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo May Have Found More Fake Accounts Created by 
Employees, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/
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2018] ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 179 
millions of fake accounts under the names of real costumers in order to 
meet demanding sales quotas.116  Some customers only discovered the 
misconduct when they were charged fees on the fraudulent accounts.117  
In August 2017, shortly after the House vote, reports surfaced that over a 
million more unauthorized accounts were discovered on top of the 2.1 
million originally reported.118  This news came after the financial 
institution paid $185 million in fines and penalties, and $142 million to 
settle class-action claims.119  The harms done to consumers by the 
unauthorized accounts included fees charged on the accounts, harm to 
credit scores, and calls from debt collectors.120  Many of the refunds 
issued to consumers were fairly small and averaged about $25.121   
In addition to the newly discovered fake accounts causing the 
scandal to resurface, Wells Fargo has also been in hot water over charging 
illegal fees to veterans to refinance their mortgages and inadvertently 
jeopardizing customers’ personal information when responding to a 
subpoena in an ongoing civil suit in New Jersey.122  The Wells Fargo 
scandal drew national criticism and dominated headlines, but for 
consumers wrongfully charged $25 in other situations, bringing an 
individual arbitration is simply not realistic when the costs of time and 
money outweigh the damage done by the financial service.123 
2. Equifax Breach 
In addition to the ongoing investigations into the Wells Fargo 
scandal, a massive breach of consumer data occurred at Equifax and put 
143 million consumers at risk leading up to the deadline for the Senate to 
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vote on reversing the Final Rule pursuant to the CRA and brought 
consumer financial concerns into the limelight.124  Following the breach, 
Equifax offered free credit monitoring services to the affected 
consumers.125  The free services, however, were accompanied by pre-
dispute arbitration clauses written into the terms and conditions.126  
Equifax quickly tried to remedy the situation by announcing that the 
arbitration clause would not apply to consumers affected by the breach, 
and multiple class-action lawsuits were filed shortly after.127 
Despite Equifax backpedaling on its arbitration clause a few days 
later,128 the story became a prime example of why the Final Rule would 
have benefited consumers.129  Congressman Brad Sherman, sitting on the 
House Financial Services Committee, spoke harshly of Equifax for the 
way the company handled the situation, accusing Equifax of attempting 
to “sneak in” an arbitration provision to the free credit monitoring 
services meant to mitigate the damage of the massive breach.130  Senator 
Elizabeth Warren, a vocal supporter of the Final Rule,131 took to Twitter 
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to advocate for it, saying that it would prohibit companies like Equifax 
from avoiding legal accountability.132 
3. Clashing Agencies and Organizations 
The Equifax breach and continued Wells Fargo scandal almost 
killed support for repeal of the Final Rule, but the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) released findings that caused a tilt 
in the other direction.133  In September 2017, the OCC released a paper 
estimating the probable costs to consumers resulting from the Final 
Rule.134  Then-acting Comptroller of the Currency Keith Noreika said at 
a fintech conference following the release of the paper that there could be 
as high as a 3.5% annual percentage rate increase in the cost of consumer 
credit.135  However, the paper issued by the OCC admitted to some of the 
same weaknesses the CFPB faced with the Study, showing “substantial 
uncertainty” about the potential effects to the cost of consumer credit.136  
The OCC’s paper estimated an expected increase of 3.43% for customers 
of the institutions involved in the Ross settlements, the same data set 
analyzed by the CFPB to estimate the effects of the Final Rule on 
consumer costs.137  Regardless, the uncertainty from both the CFPB and 
the OCC was concerning.138 
The United States Chamber of Commerce, together with other 
corporate lobbying groups, also joined the fight against the Final Rule by 
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filing a lawsuit against the CFPB on September 29, 2017.139  The 
complaint was filed in federal court in Dallas, and named the American 
Bankers Association, the American Financial Services Association, the 
Consumer Bankers Association, the Financial Services roundtable, and 
multiple Texas corporate lobbying groups as plaintiffs in addition to the 
Chamber of Commerce.140  The complaint alleged that Dodd-Frank 
created an unconstitutional structure for the CFPB, that the Final Rule 
violates the Administrative Procedure Act because the Study was “deeply 
flawed,” and the Final Rule violates Dodd-Frank by failing to advance 
the public interest or consumer welfare.141   
The attacks did not end with the OCC and Chamber of 
Commerce.142  On October 23, 2017, the Department of Treasury 
followed the OCC in issuing a statement against the Final Rule.143  The 
report from the Treasury served to echo the OCC’s condemnation of the 
rule, but did not offer any new findings about the Final Rule’s impact on 
consumer costs.144  Sam Gilford, a spokesperson for the CFPB, responded 
that the Treasury report did nothing more than bring up arguments that 
have already been analyzed in depth.145 
On the other end of the spectrum, the American Legion, the 
country’s largest veterans’ organization, joined prominent Democrats 
and consumer groups to oppose the resolution of disapproval.146  The 
veterans’ organization remains concerned with unfair and burdensome 
lending practices targeting servicemembers and their families.147  At the 
American Legion’s ninety-ninth national convention, it passed a 
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resolution in support of the Final Rule and, more specifically, against 
Congress repealing it.148 
A late-night vote by the Senate ended the Final Rule, with only 
two Republicans defecting from the vote:  Lindsey Graham and John 
Kennedy.149  Not only did the exercise of the CRA stop the Final Rule in 
its tracks, but it prevents the CFPB from writing a “substantially similar” 
rule without receiving congressional approval requiring sixty votes in the 
Senate.150 
Richard Cordray called the repeal “a giant setback” for 
consumers.151  Following the vote by the Senate, Cordray urged President 
Trump to veto the CRA repeal.152  In his letter to President Trump, 
Cordray admitted that he may be “wasting [his] time” by writing the 
letter, but wanted to make a personal appeal to the President to protect 
consumers anyway.153  Cordray urged President Trump to follow the 
support of the American Legion and the Military Coalition by vetoing the 
repeal.154  Despite Cordray’s personal appeal, President Trump signed the 
resolution of disapproval and put an end to the Final Rule.155 
This repeal and the events leading up to it highlight an ongoing 
battle with Cordray and the CFPB on one side, and the Trump 
Administration and Republican-controlled Congress on the other.156  The 
repeal had full support from the Trump Administration working in its 
favor, with Vice President Pence acting as the tie-breaker.157  With 
Noreika, a Trump appointee, as the temporary head of the OCC, the OCC 
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newly inserted itself into the battle when it released its statement 
condemning the Final Rule.158  The CFPB also had to cope with the 
Treasury reiterating the OCC’s concerns, with Steven Mnuchin at the 
head of the Department, another Trump appointee.159 
4. The Trump Administration and the CRA 
The use of the CRA also highlights a common theme of the 
Trump presidency so far.160  The CRA allows Congress to review “major 
rules”161 and pass a resolution of disapproval to repeal them within sixty 
legislative days of the rule being published to the Federal Register.162  The 
CRA was enacted in 1996,163 but had only been used to overturn a 
regulation once prior to the Trump Administration.164  Since President 
Trump took office, the CRA has been used fifteen times to overturn 
Obama-era regulations.165   
The CFPB waiting too long to publish the Final Rule may have 
contributed to its failure.166  The Study was published in 2015, and it took 
until the second half of 2017 for the Final Rule to be published.167  The 
Final Rule may have fared better under the Obama Administration, giving 
 
 158. See Kate Berry, OCC-CFPB Spat Takes Interagency Discord to a New Level, AM. 
BANKER, Oct. 18, 2017 (“Before [Noreika] became acting comptroller in May, the OCC had 
not objected to the CFPB’s arbitration policy.”). 
 159. See U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, supra note 142 (prepared after Mnuchin was 
confirmed). 
 160. See Berry, Four Questions, supra note 114 (“Before this year, the Congressional 
Review Act was a relatively obscure vehicle for members of Congress to try to undo 
regulations on various sectors.”).  
 161. “Major rule” is defined as any rule which the Office of Information and Regulatory 
Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget finds is likely to result in (1) an annual effect 
on the economy of $100,000,000 or more; (2) a major increase in costs or prices for 
consumers, individual industries, government agencies, or geographic regions; or (3) 
significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, or 
innovation. 5 U.S.C. § 804(2) (2016). 
 162. 5 U.S.C. § 802 (2016). 
 163. Id. 
 164. In 2001, the CRA was used to overturn a Department of Labor rule. U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, Congressional Review Act FAQs, http://www.gao.gov/legal/
congressional-rewiew-act/faq (last visited Jan. 24, 2018). 
 165. At the time this Note was published in February of 2018, the CRA was used fifteen 
times to pass resolutions of disapproval since President Trump took office. Id. 
 166. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210, 33403 (July 19, 2017) (codified at 
12 C.F.R. pt. 1040) (publishing the Final Rule to the Federal Register on July 19, 2017); 
ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33 (reporting to Congress in 2015 the results of the Study). 
 167. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210; ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 33. 
  
2018] ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS 185 
the very President who appointed Cordray the opportunity to veto the 
repeal if the CRA was still utilized.168  Instead, the CFPB published the 
Final Rule after President Trump took office and Congress began using 
the CRA to roll back regulations enacted under President Obama.169  
Additionally, the battle over the Final Rule waged while many were 
already speculating that Richard Cordray was going to step down or 
President Trump was going to find a reason to fire him.170 
B. Costs to the Banking Industry and Pass-Through to Consumers 
While the criticisms from the OCC and the Treasury may have 
had political motivations at the forefront, the uncertainty of the pass-
through costs to consumers was a fatal flaw for the Final Rule.171  The 
CFPB estimated that this rule would expose about 53,000 providers of 
consumer financial products and services to class actions.172  It estimated 
that this would result in 103 additional class action settlements in federal 
courts with an additional $342 million paid out to consumers.173 
To analyze whether these additional awards and the expenses of 
defending these cases would pass on costs to consumers, the Study looked 
at the settlements in Ross v. Bank of America174 in which certain credit 
card companies agreed to remove pre-dispute arbitration clauses from 
their consumer contracts for at least three and a half years.175  Based on 
the Ross settlements, the CFPB found that there was not any “statistically 
significant evidence that the price of consumer credit card services 
increased after the Ross settlers eliminated pre-dispute arbitration clauses 
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from their credit card agreements.”176  However, industry commenters 
and a trade association noted that the temporary nature of the moratorium 
and the fact that larger institutions like Bank of America are slow to 
change prices made the Ross case study inappropriate.177 
The CFPB asserted that the providers would have a larger 
incentive for compliance, and any costs passed onto consumers would be 
balanced by fewer harmful business practices by providers.178  In addition 
to changes in conduct as the result of injunctive relief, the CFPB hoped 
that consumers would also benefit from the reporting requirements 
providing more transparency into arbitration, a process that has long 
benefited from the results being kept confidential.179  The uncertainty of 
the extent of the costs being passed on to consumers was ultimately 
detrimental to the Final Rule.180   
C. De Facto Ban on Arbitration  
While some consumer advocates wanted to see a complete ban of 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in consumer financial 
service and product contracts,181 the CFPB chose instead to prohibit only 
class action waivers in the Final Rule.182  The CFPB did not claim that all 
arbitration proceedings are inherently unfair to consumers.183  Not many 
consumers actually arbitrate disputes, but consumers who did participate 
in arbitration and ultimately prevailed on their claims were awarded more 
substantial individual awards, averaging about $5,400 for the cases 
studied by the CFPB from 2010 to 2012.184  Additionally, the CFPB did 
not identify an obvious bias favoring repeat players.185  
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Industry commenters argued that the Final Rule would amount to 
a total ban on arbitration.186  If consumer financial service providers 
cannot use arbitration clauses to prevent the costs of defending class 
litigation, they argue, the Final Rule will end the practice of using 
arbitration in the financial services industry altogether.187  This argument 
makes it seem like financial institutions favor arbitration clauses 
precisely because they preclude certain claims.188 
Considering the uncertainties that still remain about the effects of 
the Final Rule, particularly concerning the costs that will be passed on to 
consumers, the CFPB should have proposed a less ambitious rule.189  In 
the Final Rule, the CFPB reserved the right to further regulate arbitration 
if the monitoring provision uncovered inherent unfairness in arbitration 
proceedings resulting from repeat player biases that the Study was unable 
to adequately quantify.190  If the CFPB chose to simply continue data 
collection and implement the monitoring rule, but still reserved this right 
to further regulate the practice in the future, the Agency may have been 
able to craft a rule that could withstand interference from Congress.191  In 
the meantime, consumers and financial service providers could still use 
arbitration for its efficiency in individual actions, while the CFPB 
adopted a watchdog status over the practice.192  Consumer advocates may 
not have been as pleased with a rule with less teeth, but such a rule would 
have given the CFPB the ability to regulate more easily in the future.193 
 
 186. See Frankel, supra note 18, at 287 (“[M]any in the financial services industry predict 
that if companies cannot use arbitration as a means of banning class actions, they will not use 
arbitration at all.”). 
 187. Frankel, supra note 18, at 286. 
 188. See Resnik, supra note 17, at 2 (“[D]espite the heralding of arbitration as a speedy 
and effective alternative to courts, the mass production of arbitration clauses has not resulted 
in ‘mass arbitration.’”). 
 189. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, supra note 133, at 3 (uncertain 
costs); CFPB supra note 30, § 10.1, at 7 (no significant evidence of costs). 
 190. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33252. 
 191. See Berry, Inside Cordray’s Ill-Fated Gamble, supra note 156 (“Had the agency 
tempered the rule instead of banning all mandatory arbitration clauses in financial contracts, 
it could have avoided having it repealed by Congress.”).   
 192. See McHenry, supra note 21 (calling arbitration highly-effective, low cost and fair). 
 193. See Berry, Inside Cordray’s Ill-Fated Gamble, supra note 156 (“The CFPB’s loss has 
big consequences for the agency – under the Congressional Review Act, they are prevented 
from adopting a future rule that is ‘substantially similar’.”).   
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V. CONCLUSION 
While the Study had its flaws,194 the Final Rule was a step in the 
right direction for the CFPB to continue monitoring the practice of 
arbitration.195  Most importantly, the Final Rule would have allowed 
consumers to seek relief against harmful conduct by providers, and 
consequently providers would have been pressured into changing 
questionable practices that spread small damages across large amounts of 
consumers.196   
Where the Study lacked the resources to appropriately study a 
large sample of arbitration proceedings, the monitoring provision would 
have allowed the CFPB to continue observing these practices.197  Should 
a complete ban on arbitration agreements in consumer financial contracts 
have become necessary, the CFPB would have been able to make that 
determination at a later date.198  However, financial institutions and their 
allies in Congress did not view the Final Rule as being the middle ground 
that the CFPB and its supporters did.199 
The flaws in the Final Rule may have resulted in a huge loss of 
opportunity for the CFPB.200  While repeal of the Final Rule does not 
mean the chance is gone forever, sixty votes in the Senate to give the 
CFPB permission to publish a substantially similar rule is unrealistic for 
the time being.201  The repeal was a huge victory for big banks, and with 
Richard Cordray being replaced with a bank-friendly President Trump 
appointee, the possibility of a similar rule coming up again within the 
next few years is virtually nonexistent.202 
 
 194. McHenry, supra note 21. 
 195. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210. 
 196. See Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (explaining the rule would allow 
consumers to sue where they previously could not); Reid, supra note 71 (claiming rule will 
pressure industry into better behavior); Resnik, supra note 17 (stating that class action suits 
will spread wealth from industry mistakes). 
 197. Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. at 33210. 
 198. Id. 
 199. See McHenry, supra note 21 (“[W]e urge you to… develop a less divisive, more 
reasonable approach that preserved arbitration as a viable, available, affordable means of 
dispute resolution and respects the decisions of consumers.”). 
 200. See Berry, Inside Cordray’s Ill-Fated, supra note 156 (explaining the significance of 
the repeal of the Final Rule on the CFPB’s ability to pass a similar rule in the future).   
 201. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2) (2016). 
 202. Berry, Turning Point, supra note 157; see McKendry, supra note 6 (discussing 
whether this repeal will lead to more rollback of more bank regulations); see Dexheimer, 
supra note 170, at 5 (discussing the impact of Cordray’s resignation).  
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